The Design of Optimal Pay-as-Bid Procurement Mechanisms
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Choi, Je-ok ; Saban, Daniela ; Weintraub, Gabriel Y. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Beschaffung | Procurement | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (65 p) |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 12, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3785023 [DOI] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; d47 ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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