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Supermodular mechanism design
Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 3, pp. 403-443
mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599433
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Supermodular mechanism design
Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 3
mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008478967
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1, pp. 95-123
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477
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Collusion constrained equilibrium
Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 307-340
We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010028
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The winner-take-all dilemma
Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 917-940
We consider collective decision making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536980
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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Forges, Françoise; Vida, Péter - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 1
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416868
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Strategy-proofness and single-crossing
Saporiti, Alejandro - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 2, pp. 127-163
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599417
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Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan Sebastián - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 1-39
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599561
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Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
Chen, Yi-chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1683-1717
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium … (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but …-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536975
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Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets
Echenique, Federico; Pereyra, Juan Sebastián - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019210