Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

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Year of publication:	2013-01-18
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Vida, Péter
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 8.2013, 1
Publisher:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Bayesian game \| cheap talk \| communication equilibrium \| correlated equilibrium \| pre-play communication

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416868