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Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773115

Collective hold-up

Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100

of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents … completion, efficiency requires concentrating bargaining power in the principal. Strengthening the bargaining position of the … or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents are better off when bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034

A theory of political gridlock

Ortner, Juan - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 555-586

between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity … substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010078

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 505-525

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the … bargaining games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010034

An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type

Kambe, Shinsuke - In: Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) 3, pp. 849-886

This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215322

Robust stability in matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599466

Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability

Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599527

A theory of school choice lotteries

Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548