Showing 1 - 10 of 10
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599506
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with … commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599566
-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about … with minimum-savings rules (another widely-studied form of commitment), and how budgeting depends on the intensity of self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215309
We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215326
the platform's forecast; when the miscalibration cost is high, the platform can achieve its commitment payoff in an … equilibrium, and the only extensive-form rationalizable strategy of the platform is its strategy in the commitment solution. Our … results show that miscalibration cost is a proxy for the degree of the platform's commitment power, and thus provide a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189059
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189076
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738407
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with … commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011127591