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WARP); and adaptations of two classical collective choice requirements (Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273759
on who is a K or an L). This shares the spirit of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives and, therefore, is … termed independence of irrelevant opinions. Our investigation of multinary group identification and the independence axiom … reports a somewhat different message from the celebrated impossibility result by Arrow (1951). We show that the independence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704934
agendas whose defining structural features, history-independence and persistence, are common in legislative settings. I then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415641
This paper explores the dynamics of nation-building policies and the conditions under which a state can promote a shared national identity on its territory. A forward-looking central government that internalizes identity dynamics shapes them by choosing the level of state centralization....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308623
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856695
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the suc- cessive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704808
We analyze a vote-buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately-drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635433
Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806548
When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that admit a (quasi)concave utility representation? I derive necessary and sufficient conditions and a tractable algorithm to verify their validity. I show that the hypothesis that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698617