Showing 51 - 60 of 134
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and … modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel … deterrence, cartelstability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartelformation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325640
the antitrust authority and the leniency program are directed exclusively to the most straightforward collusive scheme …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325765
antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics … including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325912
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325955
We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325969
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133–1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011662518
An entrant and an incumbent engage in an investment portfolio problem where each chooses how to allocate its research funds across a rival market, where they compete with one another, and a non-rival market, where they do not interact. Allowing for acquisitions distorts both players' incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469445
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526125
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in the English auction (EN) and … the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditional antitrust policy (without a leniency program) and … modern antitrust policy (with a leniency program). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202994
illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of … disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation, leniency, and cartel strategies. Without rewards to the strictly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203713