Organizations must not only take the right decisions, they must also ensure that these decisions are effectively implemented. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the same members of many organization are often responsible for both decision initiation and implementation. If these have social...

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groupsand policymakers, featuringendogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamicpatterns in economicpolicies may arise once interest group formation is taken intoaccount.

Following formal privatisation of farm land and assets in CentralEurope, the change in agriculturalproduction structures has been both more limited and different thanwas initially expected. In this paper, thetheoretical reasons underlying those expectations are reviewed. Analternative...

How much does a nation spend on resources to 'grease the wheels of trade'? To examine this question the Dutch economy is used as an exemplary case as the Netherlands are known as a nation of traders. This image was derived in the seventeenth century from successes in long distance trade,...

Transaction costs are a major reason why international trade flows are much smaller than traditional trade theory would suggest. Trust between trading partners lowers transaction costs and may therefore enhance trade. The empirical analysis of this paper shows that more trust leads to more trade...

This paper examines the relationship between organization contextual variables and humanresource management (HRM) practices in small firms. The proposed model is based on anintegration of theoretical perspectives, including the resource-based approach, institutionaltheory, transaction cost...

This article presents an agent-based modelof Prato, an Italian textile district where thousands ofsma1l firms specialise into tiny phases of the whole production process. It is an empirical model atscale 1: 1 that reconstructs the information flows between economic actors and connects them...

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

We explore the role of firms in insuring non-verifiable output. As a device that allows workers to commit to thedelivery of their output, the firm arises endogenously as an alternative to the market if workers are sufficiently riskaverse and the firm can base its incentive payments on good...

We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications...