coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value … all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of … N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …

coalitions represented by a graphon the set of players ot the coalition. A, possibly empty, set of payoffvectors is assigned to … ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove …

, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … vector socially stable if at the collection of coalitions that can attain it, all players have the same power. The socially … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the …

coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this … nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well …