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coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value … all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of … N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325973
allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost … consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a non-empty core for any vector of revenues if, and only … if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326323
coalitions represented by a graphon the set of players ot the coalition. A, possibly empty, set of payoffvectors is assigned to … ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324576
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324857
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325424
of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … vector socially stable if at the collection of coalitions that can attain it, all players have the same power. The socially … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325448
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325689
coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this … nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325794