The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is … the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash … bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random …

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is … the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash … bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random …

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time … bargaining frontier. However, when players have different time preferences, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoffs … above the bargaining frontier. We provide a thorough study of this problem without imposing the conventional assumption. Our …

We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set …

bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect … the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard optimization …

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time … bargaining frontier. However, when players have different time preferences, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoffs … above the bargaining frontier. We provide a thorough study of this problem without imposing the conventional assumption. Our …

See also 'Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences', <I>Games and Economic Behavior …</I> (2011), Vol. 73, pp.507–516.<P> We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In …

costs. Threats to switch suppliers set maximal fees. These also arise from a negotiation model that extends price …