This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … pattern of the feasible policies. In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimal allocation of … of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closed rule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeably reduced while …

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … of the feasible policies.In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimalallocation of political … as the choicebetween two alternative legislative rules: open versus closed rule.We show that, in presence of lobbying …

paradox, the reason being that the process of revealing reform outcomes is an example of sampling without replacement: every … identity (reform winner or loser?) more pessimistic about their chances of benefiting from the reform. Consequently, learning … considerations challenge the conventional wisdom that sequencing should be such that favorable reform outcomes are revealed first …