In this paper we study Markov Decision Process (MDP) problems with the restriction that at decision epochs only a finite number of given Markovian decision rules may be applied. The elements of the finite set of allowed decision rules should be mixed to improve the performance. The set of...

A version of the classical secretary problem is studied, in which one is interested in selecting one of the <I>b</I> best out of a group of <I>n</I> differently ranked persons who are presented one by one in a random order. It is assumed that <I>b</I> is bigger than or equal to 1 is a preassigned number. It is...</i></i></i>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8239378&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S026996481000032X">'Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences'</A>, 25(2), 157-69.<p>A version of the classical secretary problem is studied, in which one is interested in selecting one of the <I>b</I> best out of a group of <I>n</I> differently ranked persons who are...</i></i></p></a>

In this paper we study Markov Decision Process (MDP) problems with the restriction that at decision epochs only a finite number of given Markovian decision rules may be applied. The elements of the finite set of allowed decision rules should be mixed to improve the performance. The set of...

This discussion paper led to an article in <I>Applied Economics</I> (2012). Vol. 44(32), pages 4211-4219.<P> We examine how self-selection of workers into firms depends on the power of the firms' incentive schemes and how it affects the performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive...</p></i>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economics and Management Strategy', forthcoming.<P> Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical...</p>

This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

This paper studies wage structure characteristics and their incentive effects within one firm. Based on personnel records and an employee survey, we provide evidence that wages are attached to jobs and that promotions play a dominant role as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a...