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Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without … deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous … start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Control without Deception

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000

ofoverconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, whichmay explain decay in contributions in repeatedplay designs. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256339

Gigerenzer the Decided: A Tale of Difficult Distinctions

Heukelom, Floris - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper provides an overview of the work of Gigerenzer, thereby focusing on his criticisms of the Heuristics and Biases theory of Kahneman and Tversky. It is proposed that Gigerenzer's work can be both thematically and chronologically organized as: historical research on statistics =...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144545

Gigerenzer the Decided: A Tale of Difficult Distinctions

Heukelom, Floris - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257298

Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?

Sharif, Zara; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257417

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

on the reciprocity of employees. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255473

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255514

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

This discussion paper resulted in an article in 'Games and Economic Behavior' (2013). Volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60. Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255890

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(4), 676-686. We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123

Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment

Bradler, Christiane; Dur, Robert; Neckermann, Susanne; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of unannounced, public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256211