This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Operational Research', 2013, 224, 167-179.<P> In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are...</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economics Letters', 2012, 117, 786-789.<P> We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom...</p>

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 148, 2737-2748.<P> In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique...</p>

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611001574">, 'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>, 63(3), 388-403.<p>In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on...</p></a>

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/l87527762t620uj3/?MUD=MP">'Economic Theory'</A>, 47(1), 175-88.<p>A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games...</p></a>

We introduce a new solution for bankruptcy problems that satisfies weaker versions of the Exemption en Exclusion properties from the literature. Although the principles of Exclusion and Exemption are appealing, the specific conditions under which an agent receives its claim, respectively...

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication graph the total payoff to the players of...

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games...

In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...