We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...

We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Social Networks</I> (2012). Vol. 34(4), pages 161-179.<P> This paper proposes a new measure for a group's ability to lead society to adopt their standard of behavior, which in particular takes account of the time the group takes to convince the whole...</p></i>

We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...

See also the article in 'European Journal of Operational Research' (2014), 237, 606-616.<P> In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game...</p>