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We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247860
result persists even when a weaker stability notion is used that excludes myopic blocking. Moreover, we show that even if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168440
stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582635
incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582679
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582714
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572183
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572229
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572262
The use of lotteries is advocated to desegregate schools. We study lottery quotas embedded in the two most common school choice mechanisms, namely deferred and immediate acceptance mechanisms. Some seats are allocated based on merit (e.g., grades) and some based on lottery draws. We focus on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925467
This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias - satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397877