Median Stable Matching for College Admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004-11-18
Authors:	Klaus, Bettina ; Klijn, Flip
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	Matching \| College admissions problem \| Stability \| Fairness

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	1 pages long
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572262