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We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572138
We introduce the framework of parametrized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games without (and with) sidepayments. The framework and theorems are sufficiently general to encompass results in the literature on nonemptiness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572251
In this paper we aim at studying to what extent spillovers between firms may foster economic growth. The attention is addressed to the spillovers connected with the R&D activity that improves the quality of the goods firms supply. Our model develops a growth theory framework and we assume that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582629
games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572166
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572183
This paper analyzes the different compositions of the catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572211
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572229
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572262
stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582635
incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582679