Similar Search Results

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; Iehlé, Vincent - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168434

Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es; Luis C. … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, …

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572139

A Note on Cost Minimization in General Equilibrium Models.

Brusco, S. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582643

Overlapping Generations Economies and Symmetrical Economies under Extrinsic Uncertainty

Davila, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1998

The stationary structure of the simple overlapping generations economies is used to try to extend to the case with extrinsic uncertainty the characterizations of their stationary equilibria by means of symmetrical multiple equilibria of a related exchange economy in which the representative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168444

General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: a Dual Approach

Bel? Jerez - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168484

Nash Implementation in Truthful Strategies, Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency on the Restricted Domain of Leontief Preferences

Nicolo, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1998

In exchange economies where agents have private information, strategy-proof social choice functions defined on large domains of preferences, are not efficient. We provide a restricted domain of preferences, namely the set of generalized Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168494

Strategy-proof social choice

Barberà, Salvador - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584608

Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784

Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme

Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the … non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572143

On the Stability of Cooperation Structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572166