Showing 1 - 7 of 7
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k � 2. Saks and Yu...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024825
Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit to its second period policy, taxes on savings do not form part of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595872
Social welfare dominance criteria based on critical-level generalized utilitarian social welfare functions are investigated. An analogue of a generalized Lorenz curve called a generalized concentration curve is introduced. For a fixed critical utility level c, a partial order of utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595874
The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595887
The Nash equilibria of a tax-setting game between two governments who can set nonlinear income tax schedules for a perfectly mobile workforce whose members differ in unobserved skill levels are examined. Each government maximizes the average utility of its residents. It is shown that while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595913
This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595941
Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034031