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Verringern Management-Entlohnungskosten die Agency-Kosten? : empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen
Crespí Cladera, Rafel; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246
In the UK, the top executive remuneration policy is not geared towards the creation of value but compensation revisions are rather driven by changes in corporate size, measured by sales growth. This suggests that managing larger firms requires special managerial skills. Even in UK companies with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493782
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Comment to: "Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten?" ; ("Do remuneration schemes reduce agency costs?")
Dilling-Hansen, Mogens - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 247
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493783
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Corporate investment, asymmetric information and agency costs in the UK
Goergen, Marc; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 248-260
This paper investigates whether investment spending of firms is sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Imperfect capital markets create a hierarchy for the different sources of funds such that investment and financial decisions are not independent. The relation between corporate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493784
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Comment to: "Corporate investment, asymmetric information and agency costs in the UK"
Chirinko, Robert S. - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 261-262
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493785
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Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten? : Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen
Crespí Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001596226
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Corporate investment, asymmetric information and agency costs in the UK
Goergen, Marc; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 248-260
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001596232
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Corporate Investment, Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs in the UK
Goergen, Marc; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 248-260
This paper investigates whether investment spending of firms is sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Imperfect capital markets create a hierarchy for the different sources of funds such that investment and financial decisions are not independent. The relation between corporate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377540
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Verringern Management-Entlohnungskosten die Agency-Kosten? Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen
Crespi-Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246
In the UK, the top executive remuneration policy is not geared towards the creation of value but compensation revisions are rather driven by changes in corporate size, measured by sales growth. This suggests that managing larger firms requires special managerial skills. Even in UK companies with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377541
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Corporate Investment, Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs in the UK
Goergen, Marc; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 248-260
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007488561
Cover Image
Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten? : Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen
Crespi-Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007488563