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We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851408
, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122
We study procedurally fair matching mechanisms that produce stable matchings for the so-called marriage model of one-to-one, two-sided matching. Our main focus is on two such mechanisms: employment by lotto introduced by Aldershof et al. (1999) and the random order mechanism due to Roth and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547153
incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547371
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547404
stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547436
The use of lotteries is advocated to desegregate schools. We study lottery quotas embedded in the two most common school choice mechanisms, namely deferred and immediate acceptance mechanisms. Some seats are allocated based on merit (e.g., grades) and some based on lottery draws. We focus on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925467
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012745153
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by symmetry, ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014520271