Showing 1 - 10 of 71
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307744
This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327886
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333361
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435707
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478795
This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias - satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397877
solution and allows one to interpret a coalition as an institutional player whose preferences are obtained by aggregating the … preferences of the individual members. One implication of our solution is that forming a coalition is unprofitable in pure …-bargaining situations (the joint-bargaining paradox). We show, however, that forming a coalition can be profitable in a non-pure bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278078
Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306978
We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a proposed innovation on behalf of 'society'. Each expert's signal about the innovation's quality is generated by the available evidence and the best practices of the experts'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331153
Klassischerweise üben Vertreter der Wirtschaft sich jenseits der unmittelbaren Betroffenheit weitgehend parteipolitischer Enthaltsamkeit. Da sich in der Bundesrepublik mit der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) eine von ihrer wirtschaftspolitischen Programmatik her liberal-rechtspopulistische...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478443