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We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget … for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn … alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307679
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307683
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307095
This paper considers terrorism as an extortion activity. It uses tools from the theory of extortion and from conflict theory to describe how terrorism works, why terrorism is a persistent phenomenon, why terrorism is a violent phenomenon, and how retaliation affects the outcome. The analysis...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306959
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. We characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information. The type of one player is common knowledge. The type of the other player is drawn from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306972
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306976
and explain the formation of alliances. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306986
This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player’s strategy generates direct or indirect affine “spillover” effects that depend on the rank-order of her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306987
This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of contest success functions of Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) to contests between groups. – Contest ; conflict ; axiom ; group
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306993
It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010306994