The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system...

This paper compares the comovement of individual stock returns across emerging markets. Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) show that the US in the post war period saw rising firm specific stock return variations and thus declining comovement. We detect a similar, albeit weaker,...

Greater instability in a country's list of top corporations is associated with faster economic growth. This faster growth is primarily due to faster growth in total factor productivity in industrialized countries, and faster capital accumulation in developing countries. These findings are...

Arguments can be made on both sides of the question of whether a stringent, global corporate environmental standard represents a competitive asset or liability for multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing in emerging and developing markets. This paper seeks to answer this question by analyzing...

Countries in which billionaire heirs' wealth is large relative to G.D.P. grow more slowly; show signs of more political rent seeking, and spend less on innovation than do other countries at similar levels of development. In contrast, countries in which self-made entrepreneur billionaire wealth...