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The effectiveness of public sponsored training revisited: The importance of data and methodological choices

Biewen, Martin; Fitzenberger, Bernd; Osikominu, Aderonke; … - 2012

As the first, substantive contribution, this paper revisits the effectiveness of two widely used public sponsored training programs, the first one focusing on intensive occupational training and the second one on short-term activation and job entry. We use an exceptionally rich administrative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316892

Individual learning about consumption

Allen, Todd W.; Carroll, Christopher D. - 2001

-of-thumb?approximation to optimal behavior by trial-and-error methods as Friedman (1953) proposed long ago We find that such individual learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293482

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

Hu, Yingyao; Kayaba, Yutaka; Shum, Matt - 2010

How do people learn? We assess, in a distribution-free manner, subjects' learning and choice rules in dynamic two …-armed bandit (probabilistic reversal learning) experiments. To aid in identification and estimation, we use auxiliary measures of … subjects' beliefs, in the form of their eye-movements during the experiment. Our estimated choice probabilities and learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277527

When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2013

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837

Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2011

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282072

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule 'imitate-if-better' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282081