When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Duersch, Peter ; Oechssler, Joerg ; Schipper, Burkhard C. |
Publisher: |
Davis, CA : University of California, Department of Economics |
Subject: | imitation | tit-for-tat | decision rules | learning | exact potential games | symmetric games | repeated games | relative payoffs | zero-sum games |
Series: | Working Paper ; 13-1 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 746452829 [GVK] hdl:10419/79673 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection |
Source: |
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When is Tit-For-Tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter, (2013)
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