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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kocher, Martin G.; Putterman, Louis; … - 2010

schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a … and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly … rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287729

Preferences for redistribution and perception of fairness: An experimental study

Durante, Ruben; Putterman, Louis; van der Weele, Joël - 2013

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how demand for redistribution of income depends on self-interest, insurance … is affected by redistribution. We estimate utility weights for the different sources of demand for redistribution, with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420263

Trust among the avatars: A virtual world experiment, with and without textual and visual cues

Atlas, Stephen; Putterman, Louis - 2010

We invited residents of a virtual world who vary in real-world age and occupation to play a trust game with stakes comparable to in world wages. In different treatments, the lab wall was adorned with an emotively suggestive photograph, a suggestive text was added to the instructions, or both a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287726

Trust, communication and contracts: Experimental evidence

Ben-Ner, Avner; Putterman, Louis - 2006

We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318895

Lavish returns on cheap talk: Non-binding communication in a trust experiment

Ben-Ner, Avner; Putterman, Louis; Ren, Ting - 2007

We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318961

Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter: A behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2015

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another's behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526719

Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry, and efficiency

Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis; Unel, Bulent - 2002

We study the. Incentive effects of endogenous group formation in a voluntary contributon experiment. Subjects are given information on the past contributions of others and allowed to express a preference for partners. On the basis of the stated preferences new groups are formed. We find that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318872

Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism

Anderson, Christopher M.; Putterman, Louis - 2003

interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve. We test the price responsiveness of the demand for punishment by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318879

Not just babble: A voluntary contribution experiment with iterative numerical messages

Bochet, Olivier; Putterman, Louis - 2004

When subjects can make non-binding announcements of possible contributions to a public good numerically, there is no effect on average level of contributions in a public goods experiment relative to play without announcements. But a detailed analysis of this experiment shows that pre-play...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318891

Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2004

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a noexpulsion baseline. Expulsions were strictly of the lowest contributors, and there was an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318911