We employ laboratory methods to study stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf's economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without...

We introduce a model of the economy as a social network. Two agents are linked to the extent that they transact with each other. This generates well-defined topological notions of location, neighborhood and closeness. We investigate the implications of our model for monetary economics. When a...

The set of fair (i.e. envy free and efficient) allocation rules may be empty in wellbehaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In addition, there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another.

In an exchange economyw ith a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistakefree) process consist of (i) all core...

This paper analyzes one-good exchange economies with two infinitely-lived agents and incomplete markets. It is shown that there are no recursive (Markov) equilibria for which borrowing (debt) constraints never bind if the state space of exogenous and endogenous variables is a compact subset of...

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. Such processes are subject to persistent random shocks stemming from agents’ maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term —logit...

The seminal contribution of Debreu-Scarf (1963) connects the two concepts of core and competitive equilibrium in exchange economies. In effect, their core-equilibrium equivalence result states that, when the set of economic agents is replicated, the set of core allocations of the replica economy...

In the post-crisis period, increased regulation of financial intermediaries led to a significant decline in corporate bond market liquidity. In order to stabilize these markets, policy makers recently proposed that the trading of corporate bonds should be more centralized. In this paper, we show...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of central bank purchases of government bonds by investigating the following three questions: Under what conditions are these purchases socially desirable, what incentive problems do they mitigate, and how large are these...