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Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion: Bribes, signals and selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380984

Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games

Dal Bó, Pedro - 2002

While there is an extensive literature on the theory of in finitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how “the shadow of the future” affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. We simulate in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games in the lab by having a random continuation rule....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318999

Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism

Anderson, Christopher M.; Putterman, Louis - 2003

interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve. We test the price responsiveness of the demand for punishment by … strategic reason to punish. We nonetheless find significant levels of punishment, and we learn that both price and the extent to … which the recipient's contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318879

Varieties of risk elicitation

Friedman, Daniel; Habib, Sameh; James, Duncan; … - 2018

We explore a variety of risk preference elicitation procedures that involve direct choice from a set of lotteries, including budget lines (BL) and binary choice lists (HL). We find statistically significant violations of the expected utility hypothesis (EUH) consistent with disappointment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013808

On perverse and second-order punishment in public goods experiments with decentralized sanctioning

Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis - 2004

in several recent studies, and we report a new experiment which shows that introducing higher-order punishment …The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why … punishment is costly and at times misdirected. We document the frequency and probable causes of punishment of high contributors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318997

Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes

Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011

Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722

State or nature? Formal vs. informal sanctioning in the voluntary provision of public goods

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011

dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287730

Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter: A behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis - 2015

laboratory experiment in which subjects lack any private material incentive to report partners' actions, we find that most …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526719

Rationality on the Rise : Why Relative Risk Aversion Increases with Stake Size

Fehr-Duda, Helga; Bruhin, Adrian; Epper, Thomas - 2009

How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered if framing effects, nonlinear probability weighting, and heterogeneity of preference types are neglected. We show that the increase in relative risk aversion over gains cannot be captured by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207349

Advice and behavior in intergenerational: Ultimatum games: An experimental approach

Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry - 2000

In the real world, when people play games, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334253

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