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Bayesian Nash Equilibria with a Provision Point: An Experimental Test
Johnson, Lowell - 1997
This paper extends theory and experimentation in the context of two parties in a group who contribute to a public good with a provision point. This study analyzes the voluntary contributions game in which a public good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334331
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Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336001
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Cooperation and effort in group contests
Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2011
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057
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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes: An experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - 2010
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287731
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Fiscal federalism, taxation and grants
Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín; Niepelt, Dirk - 2016
We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011629989
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The 'flypaper effect' is not an anomaly
Roemer, John E.; Silvestre, Joaquim - 2000
An in-kind subsidy is equivalent, both theoretically and empirically, to an increase of income for an individual consumer. But the equivalence does not empirically carry over to in-kind grants by a central government to a local one: this has been seen as an anomaly and dubbed the â??flypaper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318603
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Emission Taxes, Feed-in Subsidies and the Investment in a Clean Technology by a Polluting Monopoly
García-Alaminos, Ángela; Rubio, Santiago J. - 2019
The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a monopoly that can produce the … calculated solving a two-stage policy game between the regulator and the monopoly with the regulator acting as the leader of the … output but does not affect the total output. On the other hand, the subsidy leads to the monopoly to reduce the dirty output …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146433
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Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework
Singh, Nirvikar - 2003
analyzed along three dimensions: (1) the degree of commitment or durability of laws and rules, (2) the degree of enforcement of … India's experience of governance reflects insufficiencies in all three dimensions: of durability, enforcement, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322692
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Renegotiation-Proof Third-Party Contracts under Asymmetric Information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2012
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information and can sign renegotiable contracts with a neutral third-party. Our aim is to understand whether renegotiation-proof third-party contracts can confer a strategic advantage on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500203
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Incomplete information, credibility and the Core
Dutta, Bhaskar; Vohra, Rajiv - 2001
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no information sharing and arbitrary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318931