Cooperation and effort in group contests

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef
Publisher:	Ramat-Gan : Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Rent-Seeking \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| contests \| rent seeking \| public good \| easy-riding

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2011-28
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	679396284 [GVK] hdl:10419/96080 [Handle] RePEc:biu:wpaper:2011-28 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057