We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...

Both institutional quality and institutional stability have been argued to stimulate economic growth. But to improve institutional quality, a country must endure a period of institutional change, which implies at least a little and possibly a lot of institutional instability. We investigate the...

This paper examines the relationship between corruption and public debt in 106 countries. Results suggest that corruption leads to an increase in public debt. We also investigate if the effect of corruption on pblic debt is increased by government expenditure, the shadow economy and military...

This research examines the economic origins and spread of Islam in the Old World and uncovers two empirical regularities. First, Muslim countries and ethnic groups exhibit highly unequal regional agricultural endowments. Second, Muslim adherence is systematically higher along the pre-Islamic...

We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player...

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.

We suggest a full consolidation approach that takes into account the property rights structure whithin the subsidiaries, in particular, the majority requirements on restructurings. Our approach employs a property rights index based on cooperative game theory.

Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...

We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.