Similar Search Results

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2013

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837

Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall

Neyman, Abraham; Okada, Daijiro - 2005

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266360

Once beaten, never again: Imitation in two-player potential games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2011

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282072

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule 'imitate-if-better' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282081

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule imitate-the-best can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282117

Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria

Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed - 2009

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137

Cycles and instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors population game: A continuous time experiment

Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed - 2012

cycles in the population mix. The cycle amplitude, frequency and direction are consistent with standard learning models …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288147

Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence

Shachat, Jason; Swarthout, J. Todd - 2013

follows either a reinforcement or an experience weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning … algorithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892098

Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty

Habis, Helga; Csercsik, Dávid - 2012

We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208623

Uncertainty Aversion and A Theory of Incomplete Contract

Ma, Chenghu - 2013

This paper is to provide a theoretical foundation of incomplete contract in an extensive game of multi-agent interaction. It aims to explain why rational agents may agree upon incomplete contracts even though it is costless to sign a complete one. It is argued that an incomplete contract creates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011132894

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last