Similar Search Results

"Plata o Plomo?": Bribe and punishment in a theory of political influence

Dal Bó, Ernesto; Dal Bó, Pedro; di Tella, Rafael - 2002

public life. Cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and … cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials. Protecting officials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will … decrease the frequency of corruption and may increase the quality of politicians if the judiciary is weak. These predictions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318937

The revolving door indicator: Estimating the distortionary power of the revolving door

Brezis, Elise S.; Cariolle, Joel - 2014

The "revolving door" phenomenon has become very common in most industrialised countries, and is leading to conflicts of interest as well as economic distortions. The purpose of this paper is to develop an indicator of the distortionary effects of the revolving door - The Revolving Door Indicator...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452600

Risk-sharing and land misallocation

Pietrobon, Davide; Ruggieri, Alessandro - 2024

to output and welfare gains of 19% and 29%, respectively. Improving the functioning of consumption insurance markets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015070295

Collective Lobbying in Politics: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Sweden

Liang, Che-Yuan - 2008

This paper first formulates a model of how the politicians in a local government collectively lobby to raise intergovernmental grants to their local government. The model identifies a relationship between council size and grants received. I then study this relationship empirically using the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321552

The effect of limited search ability on the quality of competitive rent-seeking clubs

Nitzan, Shmuel; Kriesler, Kobi - 2010

A competitive rent-seeking club (CRSC) offers its members the chance of winning a prize (status, position, privilege) by being selected, typically, by a civil servant or a politician. The selector replaces in our setting the usual contest success function; instead of determining the winner on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335991

Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups and free riding

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2009

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336001

Who gains from information asymmetry?

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2013

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player's type is known to both players,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336049

Cooperation and effort in group contests

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2011

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336057

The long-run earnings effects of winning a mayoral election

Bertoni, Marco; Brunello, Giorgio; Cappellari, Lorenzo; … - 2023

We estimate the effect of winning a mayoral election on long-run licit earnings, which plays a key role in the selection of local political leaders. We use Italian administrative social security data from 1995 to 2017 and a sharp regression discontinuity design based on close elections. Over a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014550297

Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2014

This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282491

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