We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates … that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre …-play messages. In a laboratory experiment, we modify communication by making the sending of messages optional and costly. Even small …

: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their … contribution decisions). We find that communication increases contributions more than punishment, and, taking into account the cost … of punishment, only communication significantly increases subjects’ earnings and thus efficiency. We study three forms of …

: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their … contribution decisions). We find that communication increases contributions more than punishment, and, taking into account the cost … of punishment, only communication significantly increases subjects’ earnings and thus efficiency. We study three forms of …

-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases … trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusions of verbal communication generates …

FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by …' performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find that if team performance is determined by the best performer (the "best …-shot technology"), then both public and private feedback are better than no feedback unless the team is composed of all low performers …

information we receive as feedback on our actions does not necessarily improve our understanding of the institutional structure …

agency in employment relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that employees …