October 2001 <p> Suppose a large economy with individual risk is modeled by a continuum of pairwise exchangeable random variables (i.i.d., in particular). Then the relevant stochastic process is jointly measurable only in degenerate cases. Yet in Monte Carlo simulation, the average of a large...</p>

March 2000 <p> Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) provide sufficient conditions for a second-best Pareto efficient allocation with linear commodity taxation to require efficient production when a finite set of consumers have continuous single-valued demand functions. This paper considers a continuum...</p>

May 1997 (Revised May 1998) <p> By definition, multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms are immune to manipulation not only by individuals misrepresenting their preferences, but also by finite coalitions exchanging tradeable goods on the side. Continuum economies are defined in which both agents'...</p>

July 2000 <p> Marshallian consumer surplus (MCS) is generally an inaccurate measure of welfare change because it neglects income effects. Suppose these effects overturn the usual demand response to a price change. Then, the deadweight loss from a distortionary tax or subsidy has the wrong sign,...</p>

October 1997 (Now published: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 100 (1998), 11--32.) <p> There are two distinct "Scandinavian consensus" approaches to public good supply, both based on agents' willingness to pay.  A Wicksell--Foley public competitive equilibrium arises from a negative consensus in...</p>

Second version: November, 1995. <p>This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders [7] for continuum economies with widespread externalities --- i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from...</p>

April 2000 <p> As is well known, a continuous parameter process with mutually independent random variables is not jointly measurable in the usual sense. This paper proposes using a natural ``one-way Fubini'' property that guarantees a unique meaningful solution to this joint measurability problem...</p>

August 1999 <p> For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in...</p>

February 1998 <p> In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof.  Barberà and Jackson's (1995) results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced,...</p>

March 1997 <p> Arrow's ``impossibility'' and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but ``saturating'' domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly)...</p>