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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
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Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division
Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244
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Dynamic Multilateral Markets
Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131110
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Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks
Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values
Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341
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The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis
Montero, Maria - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674342
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The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513
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Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
set in such games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189885
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Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These … simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904935
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Bargaining and Power
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
different bargaining solutions on apex games and show under which conditions there are core stable coalitions. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942