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We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230849
structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved – namely, core stability and internal … coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed “potential … internal stability”) for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385509
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341
sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189885
) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility … split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423160
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240
sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation …. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385367
"intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990061
characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674334