We report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. To this aim, we set up an intertemporal Dictator Game and investigate whether (and how) subjects change theirchoices, compared with those they had taken in absence of any payoff externality in a...

We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki (2004), which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of the surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects’...

In a distribution problem, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and theEgalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. TheConstrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that noagent receives more...

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...

We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...

This paper develops a two-sector model for a renewable natural resource based economy. Pareto efficient results show the optimal harvesting rate that allows for sustained long-run optimal growth, which is upper-bounded by the biological rate of reproduction. Regulation prevents from resource...

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a...

This paper considers market economies involving the choice of a public environment when there are nonconvexities in production. It discusses the decentralization of efficient allocations by means of valuation equilibrium, adapting to many private goods the notion due to Mas-Colell (1980) which...

The solution for the "Contested Garment Problem" proposed in the BabylonicTalmud, one of the most important sources of inspiration for solving situations where demand overcomes supply of some resources, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the available amount when...

This paper reports experimental evidence from a Dictator Game experiment in which subjects choose repeatedly one out of four options involving a pair of fixed monetary prizes, one for them, one for another anonymously matched subject. In some sessions, player position (i.e. the identity of the...