We report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. To this aim, we set up an intertemporal Dictator Game and investigate whether (and how) subjects change theirchoices, compared with those they had taken in absence of any payoff externality in a...

We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurki (2004), which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of the surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects’...

In a distribution problem, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and theEgalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. TheConstrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that noagent receives more...

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a...

This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...

In this paper we study a situation were the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume 1) agents have complete information and play simultaneously; and 2) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an...

The solution for the "Contested Garment Problem" proposed in the BabylonicTalmud, one of the most important sources of inspiration for solving situations where demand overcomes supply of some resources, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the available amount when...

This paper reports experimental evidence from a Dictator Game experiment in which subjects choose repeatedly one out of four options involving a pair of fixed monetary prizes, one for them, one for another anonymously matched subject. In some sessions, player position (i.e. the identity of the...

In this paper we use two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint. In this sense, we extend the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986,...