(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …

. -- Backward induction ; Coalition ; Core ; Weak dominance … backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached …

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non … we call H-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core …-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that …

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can …This paper reinterprets the γ-core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …

of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here. …

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they "fall back" on … their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If … there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition …