We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...

In "Bargaining to Lose: The Permeability Approach to Post Transition Resource Extraction" [1] Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal introduces an original and fertile explanation for the resource curse. Her "permeability" approach questions the treatment of the state as a decision maker having the public...

Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

How do incentives to collude depend on how asymmetric firms are? In many markets product quality is an important parameter that determines firms' market strategies. We study collusion in a quality-differentiated duopoly and we adopt a Nash bargaining approach to compute the collusive equilibrium...

Households do not share resources equally between their members, so estimating intra-household inequality is crucial to understanding overall inequality. However, estimating the sharing rule is difficult because expenditure data is almost always at the household level. A growing literature...

We exploit novel data collected within a randomised controlled trial of a sanitation microcredit intervention to study how intra-household gender differences in perceptions of costs and benefits of sanitation impact investment decisions. We show that – as long as the wife is involved in...

We exploit novel data collected within a randomized controlled trial of a sanitation microcredit intervention to study how intra-household gender differences in perceptions of costs and benefits of sanitation impact investment decisions. We show that — as long as the wife is involved in...

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor...