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Multi-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2009

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850139

Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2010

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members. -- cartel formation ; multi-market contact ; leniency programs ; international antitrust cooperation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955227

Optimal cross-licensing arrangements : collusion versus entry deterrence

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2018

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873750

Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements : Collusion Versus Entry Deterrence

Choi, Jay Pil - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912373

The optimal number of firms with an application to professional sports leagues

Sang Hoo Bae; Choi, Jay Pil - In: Journal of sports economics 8 (2007) 1, pp. 99-108

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003422210

FRAND royalties and injunctions for standard essential patents

Choi, Jay Pil - 2014

I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP-holders' ability to hold-up is constrained by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418280

International antitrust enforcement and multi-market contact

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2009

result, cartel prosecution can have a domino effect with the desistance of one cartel triggering the internal break-up of the … cartel in the adjacent market. We further find that the equilibrium in antitrust authorities' enforcement decisions may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824697

Optimal compatibility in systems markets

Kim, Sang-Hyun; Choi, Jay Pil - 2014

We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure market-wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between consumers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010424907

Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects

Choi, Jay Pil - 2011

This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125704

Transfer Pricing and the Arm's Length Principle Under Imperfect Competition

Choi, Jay Pil - 2019

This paper analyzes incentives of a multinational enterprise to manipulate an internal transfer price to take advantage of corporate-tax differences across countries under both monopoly and oligopoly. We examine “cost plus” and “comparable uncontrollable price” as two alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892268