Showing 51 - 60 of 8,053
The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to … neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an … augmented quantity leadership model. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012419
We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703311
The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive … agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this … result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600408
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (The American Economic Review 78(5): 1133-1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602548
Commodity markets are characterized by large volumes of forward contracts as well as high volatility. They are often accused of weak competitive pressure. This article extends the existing literature by analyzing tacit collusion of firms, forward trading and volatility simultaneously. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010426239
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors ́actions on cartel stability and firms ́incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532614
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011725688
) model where firms are heterogeneous in terms of production capacities and individual cartel decisions are endogenized. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761059
. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781965
A novel debate within competition policy and regulation circles is whether autonomous machine learning algorithms may learn to collude on prices. We show that when fims face short-run price commitments, independent Q-learning (a simple but well-established self-learning algorithm) learns to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011869980