Cartel sustainability and cartel stability

Marc Escrihuela-Villar

The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.

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Year of publication:	March 2004
Authors:	Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Publisher:	[Milano] : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Subject:	Optimal punishment \| Collusion \| Partial cartels \| Trigger strategies \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Working paper. - Milan : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2217241-5. - Vol. 2004, 44
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/117922 [Handle]
Classification:	L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600408