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A mechanism design approach to the tiebout hypothesis

Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent - In: Journal of political economy 126 (2018) 2, pp. 735-760

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906015

On the value of competition in procurement auctions

Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 70 (2002) 1, pp. 343-355

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001648110

The design of an efficient private industry

Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2004) 2/3, pp. 516-525

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002095156

A theory of deception

Ettinger, David; Jehiel, Philippe - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 2 (2010) 1, pp. 1-20

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003996243

On the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties

Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 70 (2002) 4, pp. 1477-1517

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001688090

Partnership dissolution with interdependent values

Jehiel, Philippe; Pauzner, Ady - In: The Rand journal of economics 37 (2006) 1, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003362631

Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 37 (2008) 3, pp. 469-490

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003759597

On transparency in organizations

Jehiel, Philippe - In: The review of economic studies 82 (2015) 2, pp. 736-761

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346139

Communication with forgetful liars

Jehiel, Philippe - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 605-638

I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587426