We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We...

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then...

We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We...

We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. The type of firms we focus on is workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-constrained profit maximisers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that...

We want to take a differential game approach with price dynamics to conduct an investigation into the consequences of horizontal merger of firms where the demand function is nonlinear. We take into consideration the open-loop equilibrium. We show that in relation to the fact that the demand is...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

The established view on oligopolistic competition with environmental externalities has it that, since firms neglect the external effect, their incentive to invest in R&D for pollution abatement is nil unless they are subject to some form of environmental taxation. We take a dynamic approach to...

We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural resource and pollutes the environment, starting with simple models where firms' output is not a function of the natural resource to end up with a full-fledged model in which (i)...