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incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844237
We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100711
providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252
We compare the wage costs of providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers are envious, either scheme may be the least cost one owing to the trade-off between the dissatisfaction with the prospect of unequal pay and the incentives it generates Nous comparons...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100898
Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives … wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten … to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009467139
We consider the cost of providing incentives using tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … workers, but he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084767
We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agencyproblems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agents effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005841061
We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework whereparties are risk-neutral and the agent is ¯nancially constrained. Weshow that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining poweris analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; a standard P-Aframework by varying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844235
This paper analyzes the trade-o! between monitoring and incentives in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. We derive general results on the optimalmonitoring - incentives mix for the case where both parties are risk-neutral and the agentfaces a limited liability constraint. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005841062
This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence about injurers' behavior is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the `preponderance of evidence' standard used in common law, together with ordinary exclusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005844236