This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...

The benefits and costs of different forms of job design have been analyzed in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future...

We study differently framed incentives in dynamic laboratory buyerseller relationships with multi-tasking and endogenous matching. The experimental design tries to mitigate the role of social preferences and intrinsic motivation. Absent explicit incentives, effort is low in both tasks. Their...

Purpose: This paper focuses on the job satisfaction of the employees of the ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh. Introduction: Almost every country irrespective of its stage of development is engaged in garment manufacturing and trading. This industry migrates from high-wage to low-wage...

Research’s goal is to show what managers should know in order to improve employees’ performance by guiding their behaviour and motivating them. To succeed, the manager must develop positive attitudes towards himself and the circumstances in which he is located.

Effective leadership always plays an important role in the growth and better performance of the organization. This research has been conducted to determine the impact of transformational and transactional leadership style on job success and career satisfaction. A total of 240 responses (n = 240)...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Absenteeism among manual workers is, without doubt, one of the most significant factors to affect the functioning of assembly lines in developed markets. That high levels of absenteeism have negative repercussions on the quality and costs of operations is a widely held view. According to the...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...